We can read two statements from the Holy Scriptures:
"Judge not, that you may not be judged." (Matt 7:1)
It appears on the one hand we cannot judge, but on the other hand, we CAN make judgments. How can this be? Obviously the paradox can be explained by the fact that certain judgments can be made and certain judgments cannot be, and - to not judge rashly when we can judge.
IN SECULAR SOCIETY
Based on the 5th Commandment, we know that when one man unjustly causes the death of another, it is the sin and crime of murder. In applying this truth to life, we know that when a man thrusts a knife into an unarmed woman, and she dies, the man has committed murder. When witnessing this fact we are commanded to make certain judgments, but we are also forbidden to make certain others. What are we obliged to judge?
IN THE SOCIETY OF THE CHURCH
Because man is comprised of a physical body as well as a soul, the Church was also instituted by Christ to be physical - to have a visible and perfect, societal structure to conform to that nature. Pope Pius XII, in "Mystici Corporis" gives the reason:
"Christ wills His Christian Community to be a Body which is a perfect Society. Its members must be united because they all work together towards a single end....the reason which led our Divine Redeemer to give to the community of man He founded the constitution of a Society, perfect of its kind and containing all the juridical and social elements - namely, that He might perpetuate on earth the saving work of Redemption..."
As in secular society, we likewise have the ability and duty to make personal judgments as members of the society of the Church, but there are also other judgments that we are forbidden to make, to be left for the authorities. As in our example of murder (above) the immediate judgment of reason was necessary prior to the juridical judgment - and it served the individual and community well. For our own safety and that of others we make daily, moral judgments as a duty of conscience. In the society of the Church, as a parallel to murder, the Church has always considered the teaching of even one "heresy" far worse than physical murder because it kills souls eternally, rather than just temporally. We have this ability and duty to judge the presence of such heresy for our own sake and that of others:
"Since heresy, and any kind of infidelity, is a mortal sin, they also sin mortally who expose themselves to its danger, whether by their associations, or by listening to preaching, or by their reading."
This requires an immediate judgment of our own, and today even daily, because of the prevalence of error. In the mid-1800's the Church began to take special action against the heresies of "liberalism" as they started to infect members even of the hierarchy. Liberals at that time were known to be very permissive both in their treatment of authority and in their speculation on Church doctrine. But at the same time, with a diabolical contradiction, they became LESS permissive on an important safety feature of the Church: to those laymen and lower clergy who condemned their errors they responded by saying - "You are not in the position to judge. That is for the Church to decide!" Today, we see this being thrown around quite often against those who wish to warn others of the prevalent heresies.
"if thy brother shall offend against thee, go, and rebuke him between thee and him alone. If he shall hear thee, thou shalt gain thy brother. And if he will not hear thee, take with thee one or two more: that in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word may stand. And if he will not hear them: tell the church. And if he will not hear the church, let him be to thee as the heathen and publican." (Matt. 18:15-17)
Here we see that by the time we were to correct or warn our brother with "one or two more" other people, and find that our brother has listened and amended himself, there would be no further need to "tell the Church". In this case, our personal, moral judgment was sufficient. We have done our duty based on reason and Church teaching, and made a necessary judgment helping a soul, and the Body of the Church. That we have the ability to recognize when something is against the Faith is further given example in St. Paul's exhortations to the Thessalonians and Galatians, respectively: "hold the traditions which you have learned" (2 Thess. 2:14), and "But though we, or an angel from heaven, preach a gospel to you besides that which we have preached to you, let him be anathema." (Gal 1:8). How can one follow these commands if they have not the ability to judge whether something is not a tradition or contrary to the gospel?
THE SACRED CONGREGATION OF THE INDEX
Let us now look at a short chapter of a book called, "Liberalism is a Sin", written in 1886 by a priest in Spain named Fr. Felix Sarda. The Catholics tainted with liberalism at the time attacked this book, and it was a liberal Bishop of Spain who actually tried to have the book condemned by having another liberal priest write his own book against it! The liberal priest sent both books to Rome thinking Rome would surely condemn Fr. Sarda's work, but in his blind errors he had another thing coming. Here is a portion of the letter from the Sacred Congregation dated January 10, 1887:
"Wherefore the Sacred Congregation has carefully examined both works, and decided as follows: In the first not only is nothing found contrary to sound doctrine, but its author, D. Felix Sarda merits great praise for his exposition and defense of the sound doctrine therein set forth with solidity, order and lucidity, and without personal offense to anyone."
The 32nd chapter of this 33-chapter book specifically addresses how we, as lay Catholics, not only can, but must make judgments were we to recognize a teaching against the Faith - "Yes the faithful are permitted and even commanded to give a reason for their faith, to draw out its consequences, to make applications of it, to deduce parallels and analogies from it." The whole book is excellent, but the following, short chapter is directly to our purpose. Read how human reason, "illuminated by faith, is sufficient to enable the faithful to apply well-known doctrines to such matters." It is the result of a liberal taint that tries to suppress judgments of simple human reason and the application of our faith.
Chapter XXXII.
Liberalism And Authority In Particular Cases
How is one to tell on his own authority who or what is Liberal, without having recourse to a definitive decision of the teaching Church? When a good Catholic accuses anyone of Liberalism or attacks and unmasks Liberal sophisms, the accused immediately seeks refuge in a challenge of the accuser's authority: "And pray who are you, to charge me and my journal with Liberalism? Who made you a Master in Israel to declare who is or who is not a good Catholic? And is it from you that I must take out a patent of Catholicity?" Such is the last resort of the tainted Catholic on finding himself pushed to the wall. How then are we to answer this opposition? Is the theology of Liberal Catholics sound upon this point?
"Judge not according to appearance, but judge just judgment." (John 7:24)
While the beginning sentence of Matthew, chapter 7 begins to tell us to "judge not", Our Lord says plainly 19 verses later within the same chapter, that, "By their fruits ye shall know them." Such a statement requires that we make a judgment. Let us look at the explanation both from reason, and from that which is approved teaching of the Church, in regard to what we can and cannot do.
We are obliged to judge that the act occurred, that it was against the 5th Commandment, and that the man committed the act. Though we don't know the state of the man's soul, nor his intentions or motives, we are obliged for our safety and that of others to judge - to judge that we must stay away from the man, and we can try to convince other people to do so likewise for their safety. It would be foolish for others to disbelieve the witness, but right for them to heed the warning and pass on the word (though they are not strictly obliged to believe it if they hear it from someone already known to be positively untrustworthy). More immediately to the act committed, the witness of the crime is also obliged to either apprehend the man himself, or go to the authorities so that they may apprehend him. In all this, judgments are made for the safety of oneself and others. The man's guilt of soul is NOT judged, but the outward act is, and the objective danger is judged to be present, which we must protect ourselves against. (In such a circumstance, however, we would of course not warn people who are remote from any danger.)
What we are forbidden to do is judge the suspect's conscience; this is for the priestly judge to make in the confessional. Nor can we judge him officially and juridically as the authorities of society do before punishing him, which truly gives him the status of "guilty", and results in the consequent punishments. We must accept the authoritative judgments even if we did not personally witness the crime; if we recognize him as a true judge, we abide by his decisions (unless they be intrinsically sinful). This stems from the obligations of natural law in which men form society.
St. Alphonsus Ligouri
We know first and foremost from Holy Scripture that we have this duty and ability:
That we may accuse any person or writing of Liberalism, is it necessary to have recourse to a special judgement of the church upon this particular person or this particular writing? By no means. If this Liberal paradox were true, it would furnish Liberals with a very efficacious weapon with which to practically annul all the Church's condemnations of Liberalism.
The Church alone possesses supreme doctrinal magistery in fact and in right, juris et facti; her sovereign authority is personified in the Pope. To him alone belongs the right of pronouncing the final, decisive and solemn sentence. But this does not exclude other judgments, less authoritative but very weighty, which cannot be despised and even ought to bind the Christian conscience. Of this kind are:
1. Judgments of the Bishops in their respective dioceses.
2. Judgments of pastors in their parishes.
3. Judgments of directors of consciences.
4. Judgments of theologians consulted by the lay faithful.
These judgments are of course not infallible, but they are entitled to great consideration and ought to be binding in proportion to the authority of those who give them, in the gradation we have mentioned. But it is not against judgments of this character that Liberals hurl the peremptory challenge we wish particularly to consider. There is another factor in this matter entitled to respect and that is:
5. The judgment of simple human reason duly enlightened.
Yes, human reason, to speak after the manner of theologians, has a theological place in matters of religion. Faith dominates reason, which ought to be subordinated to faith in everything. But it is altogether false to pretend that reason can do nothing, that it has no function at all in matters of faith; it is false to pretend that the inferior light, illuminated by God in the human understanding, cannot shine at all, because it does not shine as powerfully or as clearly as the superior light. Yes the faithful are permitted and even commanded to give a reason for their faith, to draw out its consequences, to make applications of it, to deduce parallels and analogies from it. It is thus by use of their reason that the faithful are enabled to suspect and measure the orthodoxy of any new doctrine, presented to them, by comparing it with a doctrine already defined. If it be not in accord, they can combat it as bad and justly stigmatize as bad the book or journal which sustains it. They cannot of course define it ex cathedra, but they can lawfully hold it as perverse and declare it such, warn others against it, raise the cry of alarm and strike the first blow against it. The faithful layman can do all this, and has done it at all times with the applause of the Church. Nor in so doing does he make himself the pastor of the flock, nor even its humblest attendant; he simply serves it as a watchdog who gives the alarm. Oportet allatrare canes. "It behooves watchdogs to bark" very opportunely said a great Spanish Bishop in reference to such occasions.
Is not perchance the part played by human reason so understood by those zealous prelates, who on a thousand occasions exhort the faithful to refrain from the reading of bad journals and works without specially pointing them out? Thus do they show their conviction that this natural criterion, illuminated by faith, is sufficient to enable the faithful to apply well-known doctrines to such matters.
Does the Index itself give the title of every forbidden book? Do we not find under the rubric of General Rules of the Index certain principles according to which good Catholics should guide themselves in forming their judgement upon books not mentioned in the Index, but which each reader is expected to apply at his own discretion? Of what use would be the rule of faith and morals, if in every particular case the faithful cannot of themselves make the immediate application; if they were constantly obliged to consult the Pope or the diocesan pastor? Just as the general rule of morality is the law, in accordance with which each one squares his own conscience, dictamen practicum, in making particular applications of this general rule, subject to correction if erroneous; so the general rule of faith, which is the infallible authority of the Church, is and ought to be in consonance with every particular judgment formed in making concrete applications, subject of course to correction and retraction in the event of mistake in so applying it. It would be rendering the superior rule of faith useless, absurd and impossible to require the supreme authority of the Church to make its special and immediate application in every case upon every occasion, which calls it forth.
This would be a species of brutal and satanic Jansenism like that of the followers of the unhappy Bishop of Ypres, when they exacted, for the reception of the sacraments, such dispositions as would make it impossible for men to profit by that which was plainly intended and instituted for them by Jesus Christ Himself.
The legal rigorism invoked by the Liberalists, in matters pertaining to faith, is as absurd as the ascetic rigorism once preached at Port Royal; it would result even more disastrously. If you doubt this look around you. The greatest rigorists on this point are the most hardened sectaries of the Liberal school. But how explain this apparent contradiction? It is easily explained, if we only reflect that nothing could be more convenient for Liberalism than to put this legal muzzle upon the lips and the pens of their most determined adversaries. It would be in truth a great triumph for them, under the pretext that no one except the Pope and the Bishops could speak with the least authority, to this impose silence upon the lay champions of the faith, such as were DeMaistre, Cortes, Veuillot, Ward, Lucas, McMaster, who once bore, and others, who now bear, the banner of the faith so boldly and unflinchingly against its most insidious foes. Liberalism would like to see such crusaders disarmed, and would prefer, above all, if they could succeed in getting the Church herself to do the disarming.
